ویکیلیکس: درخواست کمک قالیباف در سال 2010 برای آماده کردن زمینه ریاست جمهوری اش


Ghalibaf 130520

۱۳۹۲/۰۲/۳۰- این مطلب در شماره 785 نشریه انقلاب اسلامی در هجرت بتاریخ 4 تا 17 مهر 1390 منتشر شده است. از آنجا که نمایش انتخابات رژیم در پیشاروی است، دوباره اقدام به درج آن کردیم. در زیر ترجمه بخشی از گزارش ویکیلیکس 15 ژانویه 2010 را می خوانیم:

   

مامور سرکنسول آمریکا برای مراقبت سازمان انرژی ایران در 13 ژانویه با کیهان اوزدومیر که یک تاجر ترک است، ملاقات کرد. او شریک شرکت پارس اینوست میباشد که در پروژه های انرژی ایران و معاملات ملکی و پروژه های عمرانی سرمایه گذاری میکند. ازدومیر اخیرا از یک سفر یکماهه به تهران بازگشته بود و پیشنهاد کرد نظراتش را در باره تحولات سیاسی و اقتصادی ایران با ما در میان بگذارد.

 

مراقب قالیباف باشی

ازدومیر گفت زمانی که در ایران بوده با نمایندگان تجاری چند تن از افراد داخل رژیم، از جمله مدیر یک کمپانی – او اسم این کمپانی را نخواست ببرد ـ که صاحبش مجتبی خامنه ای پسر رهبر و همینطور مشاور اقتصادی رئیس مجلس لاریجانی دیدار کرده است. اما ازدومیر گفت که بیشتر زمانش را صرف معامله با شرکتهای مالی و مشاوران شهرداری تهران و کارمندان شهردار تهران محمد قالیباف گذرانده است.

   به گفته ازدومیر، قالیباف و مشاورانش گمان میکنند که او رئیس جمهور آینده خواهد بود و این در سال 2012 اتفاق خواهد افتاد و نه طی انتخابات 2014. ازدومیر گفت به او گفته اند که رهبر انقلاب از سوی تعدادی از مشاوران مورد اعتمادش، همچون ولایتی، وزیر سابق وزارت خارجه و ناطق نوری رئیس سابق مجلس، تحت فشار است که هر چه زودتر جلوی احمدی نژاد را بعنوان یک مرحله لازم جهت پایان دادن به اعتراضات بگیرد. رهبر انقلاب مخالف است زیرا با اینکار از دید مخالفان اشتباه بودن قضاوت خودش را پذیرفته است و مشکلات زیادی با احمدی نژاد بوجود خواهد آمد. بجای این کار از مشاورانش خواسته است که با لاریجانی، رئیس مجلس کار کنند تا تاریخ انتخابات مجلس و ریاست جمهوری را که با هم متفاوت هستند همراه و همزمان کنند. انتخابات آتی مجلس در سال 2012 صورت خواهد گرفت و نمایندگان مجلس تاریخ انتخابات ریاست جمهوری را به سال 2012 تغییر خواهند داد و از احمدی نژاد خواسته خواهد شد بخاطر وفاداری به رهبر به تغییر تاریخ انتخابات احترام بگذارد.

   ازدومیر میگوید که مشاوران قالیباف  گفته اند که همه شخصیتهای اصول گرایان از جمله رهبر، لاریجانی و ولایتی توافق کرده اند که قالیباف باید رئیس جمهور آینده ایران باشد. قالیبافی که اعتماد آنها را جذب کرده است و وفاداری خود را با وارد نشدن در انتخابات 2009 و کنار قرار گرفتن بعد از انتخابات نشان داده است. گرچه رهبران رژیم میدانند که انتخابات آینده  اگر مخالفان، طلب بکنند که نامزدهایشان شرکت کنند پرمخاطره خواهد بود اما رهبر و مشاورانش محاسبه کرده اند که قالیباف بعلت جوانی، کاریسما و سیاست اقتصادی عملگرا به اندازه کافی جلب رضایت بسیاری از مخالفان را  خواهد کرد. ازدومیر میگوید "مراقب قالیباف باشید. او مسلما رئیس جمهور آینده ایران خواهد شد."

 

احمدی نژاد در مقابل قالیباف: دعوای سوپرمارکتها و مترو

  

ازدومیر گفت که همکاران قالیباف از او خواسته اند که کمک به جلب سرمایه گذاری خارجی کند تا با ساختن یک مرکز خرید بزرگ، با شرکت کارفور ـ سوپر مارکت فرانسوی ـ که در سال 2009 در غرب تهران باز شده است، رقابت بکند. قالیباف و همکارانش از موفقیت این سوپر مارکت که روزانه بیش از 10000 نفر مشتری دارد تعجب کرده اند. برخلاف قرار اولیه ای که بین شهردار وقت تهران احمدی نژاد با کارفور و شرکت فرانسوی دوبی "مجید الفوتایم" بسته شده بود،  آنها از اینکه سود بایسته را از اینکار نبرده اند، ناراضی اند. در باره پیشنهاد همکاران قالیباف برای یک سوپرمارکت رقیب "هیپراستار" ازدومیر با یک شرکت ترک که کارش طراحی و ساختن سوپرمارکت است مشغول مذاکره است.

   ازدومیر ادعا میکند که همکاران قالیباف از شرکت او برای پیدا کردن کمک مالی مطمئن جهت نو کردن متروی تهران نیز کمک خواسته اند. ازدومیر میگوید این پروژه برای قالیباف بیشتر جهت صدمه زدن به حیثت احمدی نژاد است تا اینکه بهبود وضع مترو. ازدومیر میگوید دعوای تلخی در تهران حول مترو در جریان است. احمدی نژاد سعی میکند مدیریت مترو را در دست  بگیرد و قالیباف ضد این امر در شهرداری مشغول فعالیت است. احمدی نژاد بودجه مترو را کم کرده است. یک نکته پیچیده این است که پسر رفسنجانی ـ که الان با رژیم نیست ـ رئیس کمپانی متروی تهران است و ازدومیر میگوید که پسر رفسنجانی پول زیادی از بودجه مترو برده است. بخاطر اینکه هر دو طرف دعوا در پشت سر آدمهای قدرتمندی دارند، ازدومیر به این پروژه مترو اهمیت اولیه را نمیدهد.

   ازدومیر از صحبتهایی که با همکاران قالیباف داشته است گفت که یک مسئله مهمی که در آن احمدی نژاد و قالیباف در آن متفق القول هستند این است که فرماندهان نظامی رهبران بهتری از آخوندها هستند و رهبران سابقه دار سپاه پاسداران این قابلیت را پیدا کرده اند که ایران را از مشکلات کنونی بیرون آورند. با توجه به این نظر، هم قالیباف و هم احمدی نژاد درک کرده اند که وفاداری خود را به رهبر انقلاب و نظام مذهبی نشان دهند. علاوه بر این اعتقاد دارند که بعد از مرگ رهبر این نظام باید متحول شود و فقیه بعد از این رهبر باید رهبری مذهبی را تصدی کند و نه رهبری سیاسی را.  احمدی نژاد این امر را پنهان نمیکند که قصد دارد نفوذ روحانیت را در دولت کم کند اما قالیباف آرام تر و بی سر و صدا و با ملاحظه تر عمل می کند. قالیباف در موقعیت خوبی قرار دارد تا بعد از رهبر هم رئیس جمهور باقی بماند تا کشور را بسوی یک سکولاریسم نظامی رهبری کند.

 

انقلاب اسلامی: در این گزارش، دو نکته در خور اهمیت وجود دارد: یکی دلبری از قدرت خارجی که دلیل آن خارجی شدن روز افزون رژیم نسبت به جامعه ملی و نیاز بازهم بیشتر به برخورداری از حمایت قدرتهای خارجی و دیگری، دلبری از مردم از راه وعده پایان یافتن ولایت فقیه بعد از مرگ خامنه ای است. الا این که این وعده مردم را تخدیر و از حرکت باز می دارد و بعد از مرگ خامنه ای نیز، مردمی که برای تحصیل حق حاکمیت خود کوشش نکرده اند، تعیین کننده سرنوشت رژیم نمی شوند. تحت استبداد می مانند. خواه استبدادی بدون ولایت فقیه و یا استبدادی با ولایت فقیه. در حال حاضر نیز، خامنه ای نقش آلت فعل مافیاهای نظامی – مالی را بازی می کند. مردمی که بخواهند آزاد و مستقل و حقوقمند زندگی کنند، می باید خواستار استقرار ولایت جمهور مردم شوند و با جنبش همگانی خود، به این خواست، تحقق ببخشند.

  

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10ISTANBUL20.html

 

 

Viewing cable 10ISTANBUL20, IRANIAN POLITICS: A TURKISH EXPERT SAYS "KEEP AN

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Reference ID

Created

Released

Classification

Origin

10ISTANBUL20

2010-01-15 10:30

2011-08-30 01:44

CONFIDENTIAL

Consulate Istanbul

VZCZCXYZ0000

PP RUEHWEB

 

DE RUEHIT #0020/01 0151030

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

P 151030Z JAN 10

FM AMCONSUL ISTANBUL

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9437

INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ISTANBUL 000020

 

SIPDIS

 

LONDON FOR MURRAY; BERLIN FOR ROSENSTOCK-STILLER; BAKU FOR

MCCRENSKY; ASHGABAT FOR TANGBORN; BAGDAD FOR POPAL AND

HUBAH; DUBAI FOR IRPO

 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2030

TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS ECON ETRD ENRG IR TU

SUBJECT: IRANIAN POLITICS: A TURKISH EXPERT SAYS "KEEP AN

EYE ON QALIBAF"

 

REF: (A) 2009 ISTANBUL 399 (B) RPO DUBAI 11 (C) RPO

     DUBAI 3 (D) 2009 ISTANBUL 440

 

Classified By: Acting Principal Officer Win Dayton; Reason 1.5 (d).

 

 

1. (C) Summary: A Turkish contact who claims business

connections to Iranian regime insiders told us regime leaders

are planning on a scenario that would replace President

Ahmadinejad with Tehran Mayor Qalibaf in 2012. He said

Qalibaf advisors asked his help to secure Turkish funding for

several projects in Tehran including building a shopping mall

and renovating the metro, both intended to target

Ahmadinejad's interests. Our contact dismissed the Green

Movement; claimed that regime rivals were easily able to

undercut Ahmadinejad's effort to strike a nuclear deal with

the west; and argued that lifting rather than raising

sanctions on Iran is the key to gaining regime cooperation.

While we cannot vouch for our contact's claims, he has a

track record of offering insightful though sometimes

self-serving assessments. The presidential succession

scenario he describes, if true, suggests that the regime is

worried enough about the opposition's staying power to be

planning systemic changes in response, but secure enough in

its own staying power to be content with waiting until the

next elections to deal with it. End summary.

2. (C) ConGen Istanbul's NEA Iran Watcher met January 13

with Kayhan Ozdemir (please protect), a Turkish businessman

who is a managing partner of the "Pars Invest" company

(www.pars-invest.com), which invests in Iranian energy, real

estate, and infrastructure projects. Ozdemir had recently

returned from a month-long visit to Tehran and offered to

share his insights into Iranian economic and political

developments.

 

----------------------

Keep An Eye on Qalibaf

----------------------

3. (C) While in Iran Ozdemir claimed he had met with

business agents representing the interests of several regime

insiders, including the director of a company (the name of

which he would not share) owned by Mojtaba Khamenei, the son

of Supreme Leader Khamenei, as well as economic advisors of

Majles Speaker Ali Larijani. But Ozdemir said he spent most

of his time dealing with business associates and Tehran

municipality advisors and staff of Tehran's Mayor, Mohammed

Bagher Qalibaf.

 

4. (C) According to Ozdemir, Qalibaf and his advisors

believe that Qalibaf will be Iran's next president, and that

it will happen in 2012 rather than as a result of the

currently-scheduled election in 2014. Ozdemir says he was

told that Supreme Leader Khamenei (SLK) is under pressure

from several of his most trusted advisors, including former

Foreign Minister Velayati and former Majles Speaker

Nateq-Nuri, to ask Ahmadinejad to step down soon as a

necessary step to end the ongoing opposition protests. SLK

is resisting because he sees such a step as giving in to the

protesters, admitting his own misjudgment, and causing too

many problems with Ahmadinejad. Instead, he has asked his

advisors to work with Majles Speaker Larijani on legislation

that would harmonize the dates of Iran's Presidential and

Majles elections, which currently take place in different

four-year cycles. Because the next Majles elections are

scheduled for 2012, the legislation would also move the next

Presidential elections to 2012, and Ahmadinejad would be

asked to respect the new election dates out of loyalty to SLK

and respect for the will of the Majles.

5. (C) Qalibaf's advisors reportedly told Ozdemir that all

of the top figures among the "principalists" -- including

SLK, Larjani, and Velayati -- have agreed that Qalibaf should

be Iran's next president, having earned their trust and

demonstrated his loyalty by not running in 2009 and by

staying on-side after the 2009 election results. Although

regime leaders realize that the next elections will likely be

contentious if opposition outsiders demand that their own

candidates be allowed to run, SLK and his advisors calculate

that Qalibaf's youth, charisma, and pragmatic economic

policies will hold enough appeal to satisfy many

oppositionists. "Keep your eyes on Qalibaf. He will

definitely be Iran's next president" Ozdemir predicted.

 

 

Ahmadinejad vs Qalibaf: The Mall and Metro fights

------------------------------------------

 

6. (C) Ozdemir told us he was asked by Qalibaf's staff to

help secure sources of foreign investment for the

construction of a high-end shopping mall in Tehran, to

compete with a Carrefour-franchised hyper-mall called

"Hyperstar" that opened in west Tehran in September 2009.

According to Ozdemir, Qalibaf and his staff were surprised at

how successful the shopping mall has been, attracting over

10,000 customers a day, and are resentful of the fact that

"they did not get a proper cut from it", as the original deal

with Carrefour and its Dubai franchisee "Majid al-Futtaim"

(MAF) was reached when Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

was Tehran's mayor. Ozdemir is working with a Turkish

shopping mall design/construction company on a proposal for

Qalibaf's staff aimed at directly competing with the

"Hyperstar" mall.

 

7. (C) Ozdemir claims that Qalibaf's staff also asked for

his company's help in securing funding a Tehran metro

renovation, a project that Ozdemir described as more valuable

to Qalibaf as a way of harming Ahmadinejad's reputation and

interests than as a necessity for improving metro operations.

Ozdemir noted that there is a bitter fight playing out in

Tehran over control of the metro system, with Ahmadinejad

trying to put the metro regulator under his control and

Qalibaf working with the Tehran City Council to oppose the

move. While it plays out, Ahmadinejad has limited the

disbursement of government funds that were allocated to pay

for metro operations. A complicating factor is that a son of

former President Rafsanjani (currently on the outs with the

regime) is the head of the Tehran metro company, and has a

reputation according to Ozdemir for having skimmed vast sums

from the metro operating budget. Given the powerful figures

on both sides of the dispute, Ozdemir told us that working on

a Tehran metro project is not a priority for his company.

 

8. (C) The one key issue on which Qalibaf and Ahmadinejad

agree, according to Ozdemir's account of his talks with

Qalibaf advisors, is that military commanders make better

national leaders than clerics do, and that IRGC veterans have

earned the right to lead Iran out of its current crisis.

According to this theory, both Qalibaf and Ahmadinejad

recognize the need to demonstrate loyalty to SLK and the

system of a supreme religious leader, but they also believe

that the system should evolve after SLK's passing, and that

clerical leaders post-SLK should exert supreme religious

authority but not supreme political power. While Ahmadinejad

is quite openly trying to sideline clerical influence within

his government, Qalibaf intends to take a more subtle and

prudent approach on this issue. "Qalibaf expects to be

president when the Rahbar passes away" and thus well-placed

to steer Iran's leadership structure in a more secular,

albeit military-oriented, direction.

 

The Green Movement: Bigger on TV than in Real Life

----------------------------------------

 

9. (C) Ozdemir, who returned to Turkey after his lengthy

Tehran visit several days before the December 27 Ashura

demonstrations, cautioned that the Green Movement is a less

popular movement than it appears in the western press. He

assessed that most Tehranis are not involved in the

demonstrations but instead just living their lives. "Even on

days when they call for marches you can drive around large

areas of Tehran and not see any sign of them." He also

cautioned that popular movements in Iran tend to get hijacked

by the most vocal and extreme elements, warning that both the

Mujahedin-e Khalk (a terrorist organization) and holdovers

from Iran's outlawed Tudeh (communist) party are trying to

hijack the Green Movement. As they do so, Ozdemir predicted

many "normal Iranians" will be turned off by its harsher

rhetoric and will stop attending marches, leading to an

ever-diminishing movement.

 

10. (C) Ozdemir credited the regime with finally starting to

find an effective combination of (slight) conciliation and

(strong) pressure to diminish the Green Movement's appeal.

He interpreted the regime decision to try former Tehran

prosecutor Saeed Mortazavi for his involvement in the

Kahrizak detention facility deaths (ref B), while at the same

time warning opposition members not to have contact with

western organizations (ref C), as a signal that while the

regime knows and regrets that it used excessive force in the

summer it feels justified in using such force now.

 

US-Iran relations, sanctions, and investing in Iran

-------------------------------------

 

11. (C) Almost all Iranians with whom Ozdemir spoke over the

past month, both officials and private citizens, concluded

that Ahmadinejad was the most eager within the regime to

reach a nuclear deal with the U.S. Several pro-Qalibaf

officials told Ozdemir, with satisfaction, that Ahmadinejad's

enemies (including Qalibaf and Larijani) were easily able to

turn his approach into a vulnerability by convincing SLK that

Ahmadinejad wanted to give away a strategic national asset

(the LEU) only to strengthen his own political position.

 

12. (C) Asked whether business with Iran is more difficult

since the elections, Ozdemir explained that if foreign

companies have a well-placed Iranian partner with connections

to the Supreme Leader's circle, the IRGC, the Larijani

family, or a handful of other strong protectors, "doing

business in Iran is easy." He noted that most Iranian banks

now offer Turkish Lira bank accounts, though Turkish

companies must still make deposits through Bank Mellat

branches in Turkey. Turkish state-run banks Ziraat and Halk

have small offices in Tehran but do not offer private account

services. Ozdemir dismissed the effectiveness of economic

sanctions against Iran, noting that the regime will always be

able to get access to any goods it needs from a number of

sources, including in Dubai, China, and Turkey. "The only

people hurt by sanctions are poor and middle class Iranians."

Echoing Turkish policy towards Iran, Ozdemir argued that the

most effective means of securing Iranian cooperation is

simply to buy it. "Instead of adding new sanctions, lift the

old ones. They will run to cooperate with you." Pressed for

specific examples of how Turkish trade has moderated regime

behavior (ref D), however, Ozdemir had none to offer.

Ozdemir argued that U.S. companies especially in the energy

sector would also "run towards Iran", mentioning that his

company had been approached by an American energy company

(which he would not name) asking for help in investing

indirectly, via Turkish companies, in Iran's South Pars gas

field.

 

--------

Comments

--------

 

13. (C) While we cannot vouch for the credibility of

Ozdemir's claimed contacts, he has obvious experience dealing

in Iran, a track record of offering interesting assessments

of internal Iranian developments, and a willingness to

continue sharing his insights. We recognize that many of

those insights are self-serving, including his plea that the

USG should lift Iran sanctions and encourage more trade with

Iran to moderate regime behavior, as well as his praise of

Qalibaf, whose economic interests (shopping malls, etc) seem

to coincide with Ozdemir's. But Ozdemir's overtly pro-regime

leanings and quickness to dismiss the Green Movement's

lasting influence are in fact a valuable counterpoint to what

most of our Iranian contacts tell us.

. (C) The succession scenario that Ozdemir described -

including the regime leadership's plans to move up

Presidential elections to 2012 to end Ahmadinejad's second

term early and pave the way for a Qalibaf presidency -- is

fascinating and creative. It strikes us as having a ring of

plausibility. If so, it suggests that the regime is both

worried enough about the opposition's staying power (and the

resonance of their complaints against Ahmadinejad) to be

planning systemic changes in response, but also secure enough

about its own staying power to be content with effecting such

changes two years from now. End comments.

DAYTON