متن انگلیسی دو گزارش راجع به کمک ۲۱ میلیون دلار صدام حسین به غلام علی اویسی قبل از حمله عراق به ایران
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1977–1980, VOLUME XI, PART 1, IRAN: HOSTAGE CRISIS, NOVEMBER 1979–SEPTEMBER 1980
297. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Saunders) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Newsom)1
Washington, June 13, 1980
• Contacts with General Oveissi
General Oveissi left Iran shortly before the Shah—exhausted and in flight as one of the most hated figures in the Shah’s government. During his career as a military officer he was unpopular with his subordinates and owed his success primarily to his close relationship with the Shah. After a period of retreat in the U.S., he became active again among opposition figures and is now becoming—even more than former Prime Minister Bakhtiar—the most prominent oppositionist.
The CIA began [less than 1 line not declassified] contact with Oveissi following the hostage crisis. DOD officers have been in touch with him since his arrival here. CIA disclaims that any tangible support is being provided to him and insists that we “need to stay in touch.” The impression in the Iranian exile community, however, is increasingly that the U.S. is supporting Oveissi. This impression has caused previously timid Iranian money to come forth for his cause and may have contributed to the decision of the Iraqis to give him facilities for a radio station.
There are rumors that Oveissi was recently in Washington and that a group in DIA is seeking to arrange a meeting with Secretary (Page 820)Brown and General Jones. Beginning with the appearance of the recent New York Times article2 on Oveissi we can expect more and more attention to him and an increased perception that we are backing him.
Oveissi has, particularly with the appearance of U.S. backing, the capacity to cause serious trouble in Iran. No analyst we know of believes he has a future as a political leader in Iran. He is still in Iranian eyes probably the most hated of former Shah supporters. Before we go further in our contacts with Oveissi, or, rather, whether we continue them at the present level, we owe it to ourselves to examine the probable consequences of his activities.
—What are the consequences for hostage release? Will the increased turmoil produced by Oveissi’s agents (with our perceived backing) work for or against release?
—What are the likely effects on the creation of new institutions and a return to stability to Iran?
—How will the perception of our backing for Oveissi affect current or potential opposition groups (e.g., Madani)?
—How do his activities relate to the growth in strength of the Iranian left?
—How will his activities affect regional peace, i.e., Iran-Iraq, and what are the implications for oil supply and Turkey?
Those agencies who believe in contact with, or support for, Oveissi should be asked to respond to these questions. You may wish to discuss them with the intelligence community. In our view, there is a good case for closely restricting our contacts with Oveissi.
1. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Records, Iran 80. Secret. Drafted by Precht. Cleared in draft by Miles Greene.
2. Richard Burt, New York Times, June 12, p. A12, called Oveissi the leader of the Iranian opposition and quoted him as saying there would soon be a counter revolution in Iran.
343. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
• 1. Views of Iranian Exile General Oveissi that Control in Iran Could be Claimed by the Radical Left Within the Next Six Months
• 2. Funding and Support Provided to General Oveissi
1. In early August 1980, Iranian exile oppositionist General Gholam Ali Oveissi remarked that the pace of Iran’s unraveling has accelerated to the point where the country in all likelihood will be claimed by the radical Left unless action is taken within the next six months to stop it. In Oveissi’s opinion, six principal factors are responsible for the current crisis:
a. There is an apparent concerted effort by Ayatollah Khalkali, a revolutionary cleric who is a member of the Islamic Republican Party, and by what Oveissi called Palestine Liberation Organization-inspired elements to destroy and demoralize what is left of the officer corps through a systematic program of trials and executions. These are carried out arbitrarily, frequently without formal charges. Selected officers are arrested almost daily while at work or at night at home, and the next day they are executed. Random killings occur of other Iranians imprisoned for one reason or another, or for none, under the aegis of Khalkali. These killings also serve as part of a program to terrorize potential opposition to the current regime into submission or into exile. As a result, according to Oveissi, a mood of fear and despair is sweeping the country; more and more people are coming to accept a radical Leftist takeover, or even a Soviet takeover, so long as the present regime is removed.
b. Inflation and increasing unemployment both fuel political discontent.
c. The U.S. Government is perceived by Middle East leaders as being indecisive. There is almost a universal view among these leaders that the U.S. Government is weak and undependable, and few have confidence that the U.S. is willing and able to take steps necessary to shore up Western interests in the region. Many of these leaders are equivocating with traditional allegiances and feel obliged to come to terms with the “new Left.” Oveissi said his conclusions are derived from recent conversations with leaders and senior intelligence officers )Page 905( in the region, i.e., Saddam Husayn in Iraq, Suleyman Demirel in Turkey, Anwar al-Sadat and Director, Egyptian General Intelligence, General Muhammad al-Mahi in Egypt, and unspecified individuals in the Gulf.
d. An “Arab revolution” is underway that may sweep away many of the highly personalized, idiosyncratic, and largely unrepresentative elites in such countries as the shaykdoms in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Egypt. The Soviets and their surrogates are behind this revolution and are motivated by the need for new energy sources and foreign exchange and by the opportunity to fill the vacuum created by the U.S. Government’s weakness.
e. The Soviets are moving large numbers of their supporters into Baluchistan, Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, and other regions around the Caspian Sea. These supporters are drawn from ethnic groups and new recruits. In many villages, the Soviet flag is flaunted openly with little recourse to government forces.
f. The Palestine Liberation Organization is playing an increasingly important role in training the Pasdaran, in working closely with the Fedayeen-al-Khalq, and in providing praetorian guards for Iranian leaders such as Ayatollahs Khomeini and Beheshti.
2. Oveissi also observed that economic sanctions are being circumvented through sales by European and other producers of merchandise brokered via third-national invoicing, primarily in the Gulf.
3. Regarding Oveissi’s own political endeavors, he cited the following support:
a. From the Iraqis, he has received 21 million U.S. dollars and a promise of more to come if he can show progress. He is also receiving from the Iraqis sizeable quantities of RPG’s, light and heavy machine guns, rifles, mortars, explosives, ammunition, and some transport.
b. [7 lines not declassified]
c. He [less than 1 line not declassified] counts among his supporters a number of ayatollahs, including Shariat-Madari, Qomi, Shirazi, and others.
d. He claims to have assets among the military, including the entire “Rezaiyeh Division” (presumably the 64th Infantry Division headquartered at Urumiyeh—formerly called Rezaiyeh—West Azerbaijan). He also has the support of most of the Air Force pilots but not the Homafars (Air Force technicians).
e. He says that the [2 lines not declassified].
1. Source: National Security Council, Carter Intelligence Files, Box I031, Carter Intelligence Files Sep–Dec 1980. Secret. [name not declassified] sent the paper to Saunders and Hunter of the NSC Staff under an August 15 covering memorandum.